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Abstract: I argue, contra Mohan Matthen, that at least some aesthetic pleasures arising from 6 
the appreciation of aesthetic features of artworks are what he calls Ôr-pleasuresÕ as opposed to 7 
Ôf-pleasuresÕÑand moreover, that the paradigm aesthetic pleasure (arising in response to 8 
beauty) appears to be an r-pleasure on MatthenÕs terms. I then argue that talk of r- and f-9 
pleasures does not distinguish different kinds, but two different features of pleasure; so this 10 
supposed distinction (at least) cannot be used to characterize a sui generis aesthetic pleasure. 11 
Keywords: aesthetic experience; beauty; pleasure; disinterestedness 12 
1. Introduction 13 
Mohan MatthenÕs account of aesthetic pleasure revives a tradition of attempting to 14 
characterize the aesthetic ÔinternallyÕÑthat is, by appealing to features of the experience had 15 
in response to aesthetic objects rather than to the properties of aesthetic objects themselves 16 
(see, for example, Beardsley [1982: 79] for this distinction). This welcome development has a 17 
venerable pedigree: Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Bell, and Beardsley all offer ÔinternalÕ 18 
accounts. But the internalist tradition has been in continual decline since the second half of 19 
the twentieth century, due in no small measure to influential objections from George Dickie 20 
[1964, 1965], and more recently Nol Carroll [2002]. While I think the internal tradition is 21 
the right one, I am not convinced that MatthenÕs account (or any other that posits a sui 22 
generis aesthetic state as some kind of pleasure) is looking in the right place. 23 
In this article I apply critical pressure to MatthenÕs central distinction between r-24 
pleasures (restoration or relief pleasures) and f-pleasures (facilitating pleasures), in order to 25 
resist his characterization of aesthetic pleasure as a species of the latter. 26 
2. R-pleasures as aesthetic pleasures 27 
According to Matthen, r-pleasures have two characteristic properties. First, they are 28 
experienced at the cessation of certain Ômental states,Õ which are Ôdepartures from normal 29 
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resting equilibriumÕ and Ôphysically and psychologically costly to prolong indefinitelyÕ [41Ð30 
2]. Second, arising out of that first property r-pleasures are ÔpassiveÕ and ÔretrospectiveÕ, and 31 
have Ôno forward motivational forceÕ [49Ð50]. So apart from providing an informative 32 
hedonic signal, r-pleasures are motivationally epiphenomenal. 33 
Though not explicitly stated, it is implied in MatthenÕs account that satisfaction of a 34 
certain type of desire is necessary for r-pleasures to occur. To see why, let us first 35 
characterise a desire as a personal or subpersonal representation of some state of affairs, 36 
along with an attitude to its realization. Now, we can usefully divide desires into two broad 37 
types: (1) those for some prospective state of affairs not to occur, or for some present state of 38 
affairs to cease (call all of these Ônon-obtainment desiresÕ); and (2) those for some 39 
prospective state of affairs to be realized, or for some present state of affairs to continue (call 40 
these Ôobtainment desiresÕ). Satisfaction of either type gives rise to pleasure, but satisfaction 41 
of non-obtainment desires is apt to be experienced as a pleasant relief, so they are at least 42 
eligible to be r-pleasures. Satisfaction of obtainment desires, on the other hand, is not apt to 43 
result in relief (but rather in a joy or satisfaction), so they are not eligible to be r-pleasures. 44 
MatthenÕs f-pleasures, unlike r-pleasures (but like urges or drives), Ômotivate 45 
prospectively. . . . They motivate the continuation of the activity that gives rise to themÕ [60Ð46 
61]. Appealing to a facilitating nexus or Ôf-nexusÕÑa Ôcoordinated group of mental and 47 
bodily ÒpreparationsÓ that encourage, ease, and optimize [an activity]Õ [72Ð4]Ñhe defines an 48 
f-pleasure as Ôa conscious feeling that activates this f-nexusÕ [75].
1
 Matthen claims that 49 
aesthetic pleasure is a species of f-pleasure. 50 
While it is again not explicit in MatthenÕs account, the production of f-pleasures seems 51 
to involve an appraisal of the activity or object experienced in terms of desires or other self-52 
representations. In thirsty drinking or hungry eating for example, the f-pleasure that activates 53 
the Ôf-nexusÕ is counterfactually dependent on having a desire. 54 
With other f-pleasures, while a desire is not necessary they do involve (at least as a 55 
matter of fact) an appraisal of the activity in terms of representations of different aspects of 56 
the prior state of the organism (physically and psychologically) that determines whether 57 
pleasure will arise. Consider for example our pleasure in seeing a beautiful landscape. 58 
Looking at it does not satisfy any antecedent desire, but the landscape is pleasurable to 59 
                                                
1
 MatthenÕs notion of an f-pleasure seems very close to CsikszentmihalyiÕs notion of ÔflowÕ 
[Csikszentmihalyi 1975]. 
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behold so we are motivated to continue beholding it. Nonetheless, we only find this activity 60 
pleasurable, and only continue beholding it, so long as we are not bored or sated by it. 61 
In light of these considerations, MatthenÕs proposed functional architecture of the 62 
pleasure system (at least in so far as it is constituted by r- and f-pleasures) is as shown in 63 
Figure 1. 64 
65 
Figure 1. Functional architecture of the pleasure system, derived from Matthen. 66 
MatthenÕs partial characterisation of aesthetic pleasure as a species of f-pleasure, 67 
together with the fact that his characterisation of r- and f-pleasure entails that no r-pleasures 68 
can be f-pleasures, populates the categories of aesthetic and non-aesthetic pleasures in 69 
implausible ways. For some so called r-pleasures are aesthetic pleasures. 70 
Consider a musical example. Imagine listening to the first movement of HolstÕs The 71 
PlanetsÑÔMars, The Bringer of WarÕ. A rhythmically irregular ostinato provides the setting 72 
against which the melody repeatedly rises a fifth and drops a semitone, occasionally 73 
interrupted by dramatic bursts of sound. At the movementÕs sublime dnouement the 74 
orchestra rises to a clattering climax, followed by a last violent and emphatic presentation of 75 
the rhythm that undergirds the movement. Armed with MatthenÕs framework, one might 76 
expect both f- and r-pleasure when listening to ÔMarsÕ. First, there is f-pleasure from 77 
anticipation of both local and final resolutions, underwritten by the rhythmic structure and 78 
melodic contourÑand this pleasure impels us to continue engaging with the movement as it 79 
unfolds. Second, r-pleasure is occasioned in local resolutions of tension (the momentary 80 
crescendos of the militaristic bursts, the relative quiet moments afterwards, and the semitone 81 
drops after upward melodic leaps), and in the release at the end of the whole movement. 82 
These supposed r-pleasures do not in themselves encourage continued engagement, but are 83 
rather the ends to which features generating anticipatory tension tend. Indeed, the 84 
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movementÕs dnouement is exactly thatÑa wrapping up of the preceding elements; a final 85 
dissolution of tension rather than an invitation to continue listening [cf. Meyer 1956]. As r-86 
pleasures these cannot be aesthetic pleasures for Matthen [cf. Guyer this issue]. 87 
This, I submit, is an unpalatable outcome of MatthenÕs account. It is not clear why such 88 
r-pleasures should not count as aesthetic pleasures. After all, they arise out of sensitive 89 
attention to the formal and expressive features of ÔMarsÕ, just as the f-pleasures do. Indeed, 90 
the r-pleasures come from attending to parts of the same musical structure that gives rise to f-91 
pleasures (i.e. those parts of the musical structure that resolve the pleasing anticipatory 92 
tension that has been built by earlier parts). 93 
Supposing that they are indeed aesthetic pleasures, one might argue that these 94 
ostensible r-pleasures are in fact f-pleasures. The momentary resolutions of tension (by 95 
semitone drops, say) help to build further pleasurable anticipation, which makes us keep 96 
listening. Indeed, one might argue that the pleasure taken is only aesthetic to the extent that 97 
that is the case. But even if such resolutions do encourage continued listening, it is not 98 
obvious why the associated pleasures should only be aesthetic pleasures to the extent that 99 
they serve this facilitating role. Also, as this is certainly not the case at the movementÕs 100 
dnouement, on MatthenÕs account we are forced to conclude that any pleasure in that final 101 
resolution, at least, is disqualified as an aesthetic pleasure. 102 
Setting aside this objection, there is another problem for MatthenÕs account. Pleasure 103 
taken in the contemplation of beauty, which is uncontrovertibly the paradigm aesthetic 104 
pleasure, seems to qualify as r-pleasure. Writing of art in general, but presumably referring 105 
more specifically and correctly to beautiful art, Matisse observes that it is Ôa soothing, 106 
calming influence on the mind, something like a good armchair which provides relaxation 107 
from fatigueÕ [Matisse 1908: 42]. Similarly, Schopenhauer is surely right that the pleasure of 108 
beauty is brought on by a certain reliefÑthe relief arising when beauty frees us from the 109 
suffering that otherwise accompanies our being driven to follow our own will, in all its 110 
inexhaustible vicissitudes
2
. One need not buy into the loftier metaphysical fancies in which 111 
Schopenhauer casts his claim, to grasp its truth as a psychological thesis. 112 
                                                
2
 For example, Schopenhauer claims that a beautiful view is a Òcathartic of the mindÓ (1966, 
The World as Will and Representation, Volume II, chapter 33: 404). More generally, 
Schopenhauer notes that ÒWhenever [beauty] presents itself to our gaze all at once, it almost 
always succeeds in snatching us, although only for a few moments, from subjectivity, from 
the thralldom of the willÉ The storm of passions, the pressure of desire and fear, the miseries 
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Advocates of MatthenÕs account might attempt to blunt the force of this objection that 113 
the pleasure taken in beauty qua beauty is both an aesthetic pleasure and an r-pleasure (in 114 
MatthenÕs terms), by flatly denying that these pleasures are genuinely r-pleasures. They could 115 
argue that pleasure taken in beauty does not come in the satisfaction of Ônon-obtainmentÕ 116 
desires, as required, but rather in the mere cessation of the pressure they exert. But this 117 
difference with MatthenÕs central cases of r-pleasures need not disable counterexamples of 118 
the sort I adduce above. One could listen to the beautiful second movement of The PlanetsÑ119 
ÔVenus, The Bringer of PeaceÕÑmotivated by a pressing desire to alleviate oneÕs worldly 120 
concerns by appreciating its beauty. Pleasure taken in the ensuing alleviation would indeed 121 
satisfy a Ônon-obtainmentÕ desire. And it is possible that once this is achieved there may be 122 
no wish to listen further. The pleasure experienced seems then to be one of MatthenÕs r-123 
pleasures, and as a pleasure taken in the alleviation of oneÕs worldly concerns through the 124 
perception of beauty it is, ipso facto, a pleasure taken in beauty qua beauty. 125 
3. Restoring the unity of pleasure 126 
A second, more wholesale, objection is that MatthenÕs distinction between r- and f-pleasures 127 
does not amount to a metaphysically deep distinction between different ÔkindsÕ of pleasure, 128 
nor between Ôpsychological structuresÕ [4Ð5]. Rather, the distinction makes salient two 129 
different properties of just one psychological kindÑpleasure simpliciter. Specifically, 130 
MatthenÕs notion of r-pleasures at most emphasizes the involvement of an appraisal in terms 131 
of self-representations in the production of pleasure; and his notion of f-pleasures can do no 132 
more than emphasize the necessity of motivation as an effect of pleasure. If this is so, at the 133 
very least Matthen cannot use this distinction to ground an account of what is unique in 134 
aesthetic pleasure. 135 
I suggest, then, that MatthenÕs proposed architecture (see Figure 1) collapses into one 136 
involving just a single kind of pleasure (I call it the simple view; see Figure 2), and that this 137 
architecture can more elegantly accommodate the relevant cases. 138 
                                                                                                                                                  
of willing are then at once calmed and appeased in a marvelous way. For at the moment 
when, torn from the will, we have given ourselves up to pure, will-less knowing, we have 
stepped into another world, so to speak, where everything that moves our will, and thus 
violently agitates us, no longer exists.Ó (1969, The World as Will and Representation, 
Volume I, Book III, ¤38: 197). 
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 139 
Figure 2. The simple view; a simplified functional architecture of the pleasure system, 140 
modified from MatthenÕs architecture (shown in Figure 1). 141 
According to the simple view, pleasure is a single unitary psychological kind that 142 
(1) has the causal power to motivate, for example, attention, executive functions, and motor 143 
actions; and (2) is sensitive to self-representations. 144 
There are two reasons for preferring the simple view to MatthenÕs account. First, it is 145 
more parsimonious; it appears to do the same work with fewer ontological commitments. 146 
Second, and at least of equal importance, it seems to reflect more accurately the relevant 147 
phenomena. 148 
How is this to be argued? Consider thirsty drinking. As we have seen, Matthen finds 149 
two pleasures here: one that occurs during the drinking, and motivates further drinking; and 150 
one that occurs immediately after, dissipates quickly, and does not motivate. But it is not 151 
necessary to posit these two kinds of pleasure. The supposed f-pleasure in this example seems 152 
rather to be an r-pleasure (to persist in using MatthenÕs terms). 153 
First, the pleasure in thirsty drinking has at least one of the characteristic features of r-154 
pleasures, since it results from satisfaction of a Ônon-obtainmentÕ desire. Not only is the 155 
supposed f-pleasure counterfactually dependent on a desire for hydration just as the supposed 156 
r-pleasure is: the f-pleasure diminishes as the desire is sated by the consumption of water, and 157 
to the extent that the water has properties apt for satisfying that desire (thirst-quenchingness, 158 
purity and coolness). Moreover, pleasure from drinking when thirsty has the phenomenology 159 
of a diminishing relief. If the pleasure were not taken in the satisfaction of the non-160 
obtainment desire, it is hard to see why it should decrease as the desire diminishes and to the 161 
extent that the water has properties that are apt to satisfy the desire, and why it should feel 162 
like relief. So MatthenÕs appeal to a distinct kind of pleasure seems nugatory in this case. 163 
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Second, the supposedly distinct f-pleasure and r-pleasure both have causal efficacyÑ164 
but the attempted distinction obscures this fact. Pleasure during thirsty drinking certainly has 165 
an effect in facilitating further consumption; but the pleasure that comes once drinking has 166 
finished is still efficacious in the Ôf-nexusÕ, even if it does not cause continued drinking on 167 
that very occasion. As a result of this latter instance of pleasure, one is induced to attend 168 
better to the feeling of having had oneÕs thirst quenched, and to the nature of the activity that 169 
quenched it. Moreover, one will be more likely to pursue the drinking of water in future, and 170 
discriminatively attend to and seek out cold and pure water when thirsty. 171 
On MatthenÕs account then, we simply seem to be individuating pleasures in the wrong 172 
way in this case: the separately named manifestations are still instances of pleasure 173 
simpliciter, despite one coming before complete satisfaction of the relevant desire, and the 174 
other coming when satisfaction is achieved. 175 
Even accepting this collapse of the original distinction between r- and f-pleasures in 176 
cases like thirsty drinking, a defender of MatthenÕs account can still exploit two facts: at least 177 
some pleasures do not involve desire satisfaction; and r-pleasures seem to necessarily involve 178 
Ônon-obtainmentÕ desire satisfaction. Together, these facts might motivate a reworked 179 
distinction between f-pleasures and somewhat re-theorized r-pleasures (since r-pleasures have 180 
just been shown to motivate prospectively, in thirsty drinking). 181 
Consider the example discussed earlier of the pleasure that comes in looking at a 182 
landscape experienced as beautiful. This activity need not satisfy any antecedent desire, but 183 
simply give rise to pleasure that motivates us to keep looking. This is quite plausible; and one 184 
might attempt a distinction on this basis, as do many proponents of Ôdisinterested pleasureÕ. 185 
But we could object that the f-pleasure here only motivates to the extent that it is constrained 186 
by an antecedent appraisal in terms of self-representations (such as the novelty of that 187 
landscape), just like our reformed r-pleasures. 188 
Of course, this is not to deny that one can draw distinctions according to whether 189 
desires are involved (even ÔobtainmentÕ or Ônon-obtainmentÕ desires), or whether relief or 190 
satisfaction is felt, or whether the activity is of a certain kind. Certainly one can; and one is 191 
able to explain differences between different instances of pleasurable experience and 192 
episodes of activity in terms of these different components. But it is not established that any 193 
such distinction warrants acceptance of fundamentally different kinds of pleasure per se, or 194 
whether any such distinction can be used to ground some sui generis aesthetic state. Myself, I 195 
am not sanguine about any project to affirm these claims. 196 
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